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Abstract
Causal attribution has been one of the most influential frameworks in the literature of achievement motivation, but previous
studies considered achievement attribution as relatively deliberate and effortful processes. In the current study, we tested
the hypothesis that people automatically attribute their achievement failure to their ability, but reduce the ability
attribution in a controlled manner. To address this hypothesis, we measured participants’ causal attribution belief for their
task failure either under the cognitive load (load condition) or with full attention (no-load condition). Across two studies,
participants attributed task performance to their ability more in the load than in the no-load condition. The increased ability
attribution under cognitive load further affected intrinsic motivation. These results indicate that cognitive resources
available after feedback play crucial roles in determining causal attribution belief, as well as achievement motivations.
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Introduction
Causal attribution has been one of the most influential
frameworks for understanding how individuals perceive and
interpret their own behaviors as well as other’s behaviors. In the
realm of achievement motivation, since Weiner and Kukla’s
influential work [1], a vast amount of research has addressed
motivational and emotional consequences of perceived causes
(e.g., ability, task difficulty) in achievement contexts [2–4].
Researchers have also revealed various factors influencing causal
attribution of one’s achievement performance (for reviews see [5–
6]). Despite the extensive previous research, however, past studies
have been relatively mute on the underlying process of causal
attribution in achievement settings. In the current study, drawing
on the dual process models of social cognition [7], we examine
how people’s causal attribution of their performance is associated
with automatic- and controlled- processes.
Ability is one of the primary concerns of people in achievement
settings [8]. People are motivated to seek ability information [9]
and are chronically concerned with how their ability is evaluated
[10]. One’s belief about ability also alters achievement behaviors
[11–12] and reactions to performance feedback [13]. Further-
more, threats on people’s ability impair performance in a wide
variety of tasks [14]. Because of the strong saliency of ability, it
seems to be the most straightforward factor in which one attributes
his/her failure when faced with achievement feedback [15].
However, attributing task failure to one’s ability can lead to
maladaptive outcomes. Ability is an internal and stable causal
factor that people cannot control; thus ability attribution following
task failure tends to augment one’s expectation for future failures,
demotivating people from the task [4]. Indeed, ability attributions
for failure are known to lower motivation and self-esteem, and
increase depressive symptoms as well as negative affects [3,16].
Importantly, past studies indicated that people are aware of those
maladaptive consequences of ability attribution [17–18]. This
suggests the possibility that people have an inclination to reduce
ability attributions when facing failure outcomes.
In the current study, we hypothesized that people automatically
attribute their task performance to their ability, but reduce ability
attribution in a controlled manner. We addressed separate
contributions of automatic and controlled processes by manipu-
lating participants’ cognitive resources [19]. During the study, we
measured participants’ causal attribution of their failure while
manipulating their cognitive resources; Half of participants were
told to infer causal reasons under cognitive load (load condition),
whereas the other made an attribution with full attention (no-load
condition). If ability attribution occurs automatically and is
reduced in a controlled manner, ability attribution should be
enhanced in the load than in the no-load condition. Study 1
provided the evidence for this hypothesis. Study 2 replicated the
automatic ability attribution even when ability was not a plausible
cause for failure. Study 2 also documented motivational conse-
quences of ability attribution by assessing participants’ motivation
about achievement tasks.
Study 1
Method
Thirty-three Japanese undergraduates (Mage = 20.38; 15 males)
were randomly assigned to the load or no-load condition. The
experimental protocol (both Studies 1 and 2) conformed to the
ethics guidelines of the Japanese Psychological Association. The
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study was approved by the ethics committee of the Graduate
School of Education at the University of Tokyo and participants
provided their written consent. All data were analyzed anony-
mously; data files are available on request.
Participants were given a modified version of the Raven’s
progressive matrices task for 10 min. The task consisted of 10
difficult items; no one could solve all of the items. Immediately
after the task, a computer provided bogus success feedback: ‘‘Your
score is 28 (the average score from undergrads in your university is
54).’’ All participants then answered a manipulation check
question (‘‘How well did you perform on the reasoning test?’’)
on a 4-point scale (1: failed, 2: relatively failed, 3: relatively
succeeded, 4: succeeded). Both in Studies 1 and 2, most
participants reported in the manipulation check question that
they failed or relatively failed at the task (Study 1: M=1.67,
SD=0.69; Study 2: M=1.67, SD=0.48), but two participants in
Study 1 and four participants in Study 2 reported that they
succeeded or relatively succeeded on the task. Because the causal
reasoning questionnaire was designed only for failure situations,
we did not conduct the causal reasoning questionnaire to these
participants; therefore, they were not included in the reported
analyses.
Participants were then given a causal reasoning questionnaire
[20–21] and rated the extent to which each item caused their
failure on a 5-point scale. The questionnaire included four items
on ability attribution (e.g., ‘‘because of the lack of my reasoning
ability,’’ ‘‘because I’m not smart’’; reliability = .87) and four items
on task attribution (e.g., ‘‘because the task was difficult,’’ ‘‘because
the test was too advanced’’; reliability = .84).
Participants in the no-load condition answered the attribution
questionnaire without any additional tasks. In contrast, partici-
pants in the load condition answered the questionnaires while
working on a sound-pitch judgment task obtained from previous
research [19]. In the sound judgment task, participants listened to
a sound sequence which consisted of a low-, a medium-, and a
high- pitched tone in randomized order with variable intervals
(approx 1–3 secs). The participants’ task was to keep track of the
sound sequence and press a button immediately after detecting a
sequence of low-, medium-, and high- pitched tones in that order.
Participants were familiarized with this dual task procedure using a
different questionnaire at the beginning of the study.
Results
Generalized Eta Squared (g2G ) was used to estimate effect sizes
[22]. One participant was identified as an outlier and excluded
from the analysis (i.e., Tukey’s criterion of three times the
interquartile range higher than the third quartile. Grubbs’ test for
outliers was significant [23]). As shown in Figure 1, task load
manipulation selectively enhanced ability attribution. A 2 (cause:
task, ability) X 2 (attention) mixed ANOVA with cause as a
repeated measures factor on the attribution scores revealed a
significant cause x attention interaction, F(1, 28) = 4.86, g2 G = .05,
p,.05. Participants reported higher ability attribution in the load
than in the no-load condition (Figure 1), F(1, 28) = 4.65, p,.05,
while the task attribution score did not differ across the conditions
(p..78).
Study 2
Study 2 sought to extend Study 1 in two ways. First, we
examined whether our findings can be replicated even when
ability was not a plausible cause for failure. Specifically,
participants were explicitly instructed that the task was unusually
difficult when they are provided failure feedback. Thus, partici-
pants did not have any plausible reasons to believe that the failure
was caused by their lack of ability, which should allow for a
stronger test for the automaticity of ability attribution. Second,
Study 2 assessed intrinsic motivation after the task to address
motivational consequences of ability attribution. Given that ability
attribution after failure is associated with maladaptive outcomes,
we could expect that increased ability attribution under cognitive
load should reduce intrinsic motivations toward a task. In other
words, we hypothesized that ability attribution serves as a
mediator between cognitive load manipulation and intrinsic
motivation.
Method
Twenty-eight Japanese undergraduates (Mage = 19.8; 20 males)
were randomly assigned to the load or no-load condition. The
procedure was identical to Study 1, with two exceptions. First, the
feedback included only participants’ raw score without the average
score of other students (i.e., ‘‘Your score is 28’’), and participants
were explicitly told that the task was designed to be extremely
difficult for all students. Second, along with the causal attribution
measurement (reliability: ability = .97, task = .86), participants
answered five items on intrinsic motivation to the reasoning task
with a 5-point scale (reliability = .92; e.g., ‘‘I found the task
interesting’’ [24]).
Results
As indicated in Figure 2, task load manipulation again
selectively enhanced ability attribution. A 2 (cause) X 2 (attention)
ANOVA with cause as a repeated measures factor on the
attribution scores revealed a main effect of cause, F(1,
22) = 4.85, g2Gs= .07, p,.05, and a significant cause and attention
interaction (Figure 2), F(1, 22) = 4.85, g2Gs= .07, p,.05. Consistent
with Study 1, participants reported higher ability attribution in the
load than in the no-load condition, F(1, 22) = 8.09, p,.01, but the
task attribution score did not differ across the conditions (p..80).
Additional analysis (Figure 3A) showed that participants showed
decreased intrinsic motivation in the load than in the no-load
condition, F(1, 22) = 6.04, g2G = .22, p,.05. To address whether
the reduced motivation in the load condition is due to their
Figure 1. Ability and task attribution made under full and
divided attention condition after participants received failure
feedback (Study 1). Ability attribution score was higher in the load
condition than in the no-load condition, while task attribution score did
not differ across attention manipulation. Error bars represent standard
errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0063066.g001
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enhanced ability attribution, we performed a meditational analysis
by regressing intrinsic motivation on the load manipulation and
ability attribution scores. As expected, higher ability attribution
predicted less intrinsic motivation (B=20.47, p,.05), whereas the
load manipulation no longer had a significant effect on intrinsic
motivation after controlling for ability attribution (B=20.37,
p= .26). We also computed 95% confidence intervals of the
mediation effect (load manipulation 2. ability attribution 2.
intrinsic motivation) using the analytic distribution of a product
[25]. The analysis revealed upper (20.056) and lower (20.903)
limits that did not include 0. These results indicate that ability
attribution was a statistically significant mediator of the relation-
ship between the load manipulation and motivation (Figure 3B).
General Discussion
Overall, the findings support our hypothesis that people
automatically attribute their task performance to ability but
reduce ability attribution in a controlled manner. Specifically, our
experiments showed that participants attributed their task failure
to ability more when cognitive resources were depleted than when
they had sufficient cognitive resources. These patterns were
observed even when ability is not a plausible cause of failure –
participants’ awareness of other possible causal factors did not
alter this increased ability attribution under cognitive load.
Furthermore, our analysis indicated that the increased ability
attribution due to cognitive depletion is related to impaired
intrinsic motivation. Attribution literature on achievement moti-
vation has considered attribution mainly as deliberate and effortful
processes [4]. Our work, on the other hand, suggested the
importance of considering the cognitive processes underlying
causal attribution to achievement outcomes.
Our work has implications not only on the achievement
motivation literature, but also on the literature on self-serving
bias. Studies in self-serving bias have indicated that, when
inferring causal reasons of one’s own behavior, people tend to
attribute failure to external causes (e.g., task, teacher, mood) and
success to internal causes (e.g., ability and effort; for reviews, see
[26]). This is interpreted as the manifestation of self-enhancement
motive [27]. However, most of the empirical studies in self-serving
attributional bias collapsed different types of attributions together;
they typically compute a single internal-external attribution score
by subtracting external attributions (e.g., task, mood) from internal
attributions (ability, effort) [26,28]. Our work, on the other hand,
highlighted the importance of examining the unique role played
by ability attribution. It is also important to note that some
behavioral evidence suggested that self-enhancement tendency
could manifest automatically [29–30]. However, these studies
examined self-enhancement motive in the absence of self-relevant
outcome feedback. There is a large body of literature indicating
that negative outcome feedback is processed automatically and has
a big impact on the self [31]. In such case, self-enhancement
motive may serve as a motivator of controlled process to repair the
rapidly decreased self-esteem [32–33]. Future work would do well
to examine such multifaceted function of self-enhancement
motive.
A potential limitation of our research is that we used self-reports
to assess attribution and intrinsic motivation. Although this is a
standard way of assessing attribution and intrinsic motivation in
previous literature [34–35], the use of self-report measures has
been critiqued, due to the susceptibility of self-report data to
various response biases [36]. Future work is needed to validate our
findings using behavioral measurements (e.g., task-engagement to
assess intrinsic motivation [37]).
Previous studies have shown that people are aware of the
maladaptive consequences of ability attribution after failure [18].
Given this observation, it is a mystery why people do not stop
attributing their failure to ability. Our findings provide a clue to
address this issue – people do know it is maladaptive, but cannot
avoid it in the first place. We hope these findings not only provide
Figure 2. Ability and task attribution made under full and
divided attention condition after participants received failure
feedback (Study 2). Ability attribution score was higher in the load
condition than in the no-load condition, even when ability is not a
plausible cause for failure. Task attribution score did not differ across
attention manipulation. Error bars represent standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0063066.g002
Figure 3. (A) The intrinsic motivation about the reasoning task
was decreased in the load condition than in the no-load
condition after failure. (B) The effects of cognitive resources on the
motivation were fully mediated by the ability attribution. Solid lines
represent significant paths and a dashed line represents a non-
significant effect.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0063066.g003
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a better understanding of human causal attributional process, but
also bring practical implications on how to alter maladaptive
attribution in achievement settings [38].
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